Download The Power to Tax: Analytic Foundations of a Fiscal Constitution, by Geoffrey Brennan, James M. Buchanan
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The Power to Tax: Analytic Foundations of a Fiscal Constitution, by Geoffrey Brennan, James M. Buchanan
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Should government's power to tax be limited? The events of the late 1970s in the wake of California's Proposition 13 brought this question very sharply into popular focus. Whether the power to tax should be restricted, and if so how, are issues of immediate policy significance. Providing a serious analysis of these issues, the authors of this 1980 book offer an approach to the understanding and evaluation of the fiscal system, one that yields profound implications. The central question becomes: how much 'power to tax' would the citizen voluntarily grant to government as a party to some initial social contract devising a fiscal constitution? Those in office are assumed to exploit the power assigned to them to the maximum possible extent: government is modelled as 'revenue-maximizing Leviathan'. Armed with such a model, the authors proceed to trace out the restrictions on the power to tax that might be expected to emerge from the citizen's constitutional deliberations.
- Sales Rank: #9104397 in Books
- Brand: Cambridge University Press
- Published on: 1980-10-31
- Ingredients: Example Ingredients
- Original language: English
- Number of items: 1
- Dimensions: 8.98" h x .67" w x 5.98" l, 1.15 pounds
- Binding: Hardcover
- 246 pages
- Used Book in Good Condition
Review
This book provides analytic foundations for the discussion centering around questions of tax and the constitution, so prominent in political debate. -- Book Description
Most helpful customer reviews
3 of 3 people found the following review helpful.
Analytical framework to help understand taxpayers' revolt
By Jerry H. Tempelman
Geoffrey Brennan and James M. Buchanan's The Power to Tax provides an analytical framework for understanding the so-called taxpayers' revolt of the late 1970s, when taxpayers began using referendums to enact amendments to state constitutions in order to limit taxation and hold down public spending by state legislatures. The book combines the orthodox public-finance approach with the public-choice approach to normative tax analysis. Government does not really fit the description of benevolent despot that is implicit in orthodox public-finance theory, nor can the taxpayers' revolt be explained by the median-voter model of public-choice theory. Instead, citizen-taxpayers saw government as a budget-maximizing Leviathan-like bureaucracy, whose behavior can analytically be described by the monopoly model of mainstream economics.
Traditional public-finance based normative tax analysis advises governments how to maximize revenues, or how to pluck the goose in order to obtain the most feathers with the least amount of hissing. It comes up with criteria of what it sees as efficiency and equity, such as comprehensiveness of the tax base and progression in the rate structure. Brennan & Buchanan instead adopt a different perspective: maximization of tax revenues may be in the interest of government (or, more precisely, of politicians and bureaucrats), but not of the citizen-taxpayer. The authors therefore come up with constitutional tax rules intended to constrain Leviathan. These rules are pretty much the opposite of those derived by orthodox public-finance theory, namely a non-comprehensive tax base and uniformity of tax rates (e.g. a proportional, or flat, tax).
The reason why tax limitations are to be enacted at the constitutional level is that tax limitation proposals did not emerge from the normal electorate process. Mere electoral constraints proved inadequate in limiting government to the level desired by the citizen-taxpayer. Furthermore, tax limitations are designed specifically to prevent government from taking those actions that citizens-taxpayers believe government would have taken, in spite of existing electoral constraints, in the absence of tax limitations.
In a nutshell, the book is about tax-base and tax-rate constraints. Conventional norms of tax analysis call for comprehensiveness and progression. But if you want to hold down the size of government, you do not favor comprehensiveness, and you favor uniformity of the tax rate. In short, if you want small government, you favor a flat tax with lots of deductions.
Critics of the book have charged that government is not at all times akin to a revenue-maximizing Leviathan. But, although this may be true, constraining rules such as tax limitations may serve as a "worst-case" check intended to prevent government from becoming that. This point of clarification became the basis of the authors' subsequent collaboration, The Reason of Rules, which is vol. 10 in the Buchanan Collected Works series.
The essence of The Power to Tax is also presented in two papers by the authors contained in volume 14 of Buchanan's Collected Works. I recommend that volume instead, since The Power to Tax does not really add much new insight to the analysis in those two papers.
0 of 1 people found the following review helpful.
My bad.
By Phillip E. Myers
I goofed up ad thought this source was the Papers of James Buchanan, U.S. President inthe 1850s. My bad.
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