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John Searle's Speech Acts (1969) and Expression and Meaning (1979) developed a highly original and influential approach to the study of language. But behind both works lay the assumption that the philosophy of language is in the end a branch of the philosophy of the mind: speech acts are forms of human action and represent just one example of the mind's capacity to relate the human organism to the world. The present book is concerned with these biologically fundamental capacities, and, though third in the sequence, in effect it provides the philosophical foundations for the other two. Intentionality is taken to be the crucial mental phenomenon, and its analysis involves wide-ranging discussions of perception, action, causation, meaning, and reference. In all these areas John Searle has original and stimulating views. He ends with a resolution of the 'mind-body' problem.
- Sales Rank: #6292134 in Books
- Brand: Brand: Cambridge University Press
- Published on: 1983-05-31
- Original language: English
- Number of items: 1
- Dimensions: 8.50" h x .87" w x 5.43" l, .10 pounds
- Binding: Hardcover
- 288 pages
- Used Book in Good Condition
Review
'The strengths of the book lie in its vigor and general clarity, and in the stimulating discussions of the pre-intentional background necessary to the existence of intentional states and of the intentions of a communicator. [Searle's] sharp statement of the structural parallels between action and perception is possibly the best introduction to that phenomenon.' Philosophical Review
'The scope and consistency of his attempt to explain the Philosophy of Language as part of the Philosophy of the Mind is truly impressive.' Nous
'The prose is clear, the approach is straightforward, the arguments powerful. It would be an especially good text to use in the graduate seminar in the philosophy of the mind.' International Studies in Philosophy
'A thorough study of all aspects of Searle's approach is essential to any serious study of issues in the philosophy of mind.' Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
Most helpful customer reviews
0 of 0 people found the following review helpful.
A CLASSIC ESSAY
By Claudio Ferreira Costa
I disagree with most critic reviews of Searle's book. My prefered analytical philosophers in America are Searle and Kripke. The difference is that Kripke is academically hipervaluated while Searle is academically underrated. Easy to explain, since the ideal language philosophy has won the race in the academy, while Searle, comming from the philosophy of ordinary language, belongs to the few (if not the only) remanescents of the old orthodoxy. Moreover, he is very critical against the brilliant absurdities so easy to find in the present philosophy of language, what surelly isn't flattering for the academic millieu. About the way he writtes I found it extremely clear and even funny, though academically prophane, remembering Popper. The book is densely written and brings originality in nearly each page. His criticism of Kripke's and Putnam's theories, though not decisive, shows that the new orthodoxy in philosophy of language has at least as many flaws as the old orthodoxy to which he himself belongs. The deep insight that sustains the book is the idea that the speech act theory reflects the structure of intentionality. Any intentional act must have the form M(p) (M = intentional mode) in the same way as any speech act must have the form F(p) (F = ilocutionary force). Philosophically this is the best of Searle's books.
23 of 30 people found the following review helpful.
Excellent Modern Theory of Mind
By D. S. Heersink
P>In his usual manner, Searle tackles the problem of consciousness and how the mind works in this thorough examination of both classical and contemporary concerns. It's an exceedingly masterful task that is richly rewarding, if only slightly frustrating because of his poor syntactical structures.
Analytic philosophy is often difficult enough, and this book is of average difficulty, but when an author does not write clearly with near-run-on sentences, myandering and labyrinthine syntax, and in less than necessary obtuseness, it is a drawback. This is my only complaint.
Part of the problem is the author's, part reader's. Searle is going against the analytic grain by expositing a theory of mind that is at once novel and distinctive, clearing up confusions and ambiguities along the way. But these new ideas and the direction of fit they present are exciting and facinating, even if the presentation is less than perfect.
It's hard to imagine modern-day analytic philosophers going out on a limb with actual theory (they tend toward the criticism of others), so that it is refreshing that someone of Mr. Searle's reputation and caliber takes a stab at presenting a coherent theory of mind in new dress and ambiance: Naive realism.
This isn't the first book of Searle's I'd recommend. That honor goes to "Mind, Language, and Society," his short, but densely argued, and clearer exposition, of several ideas (some of which he adumbrates from this volume). If you like what you read in THAT book, this book will further delight you.
What's so agreeable about Searle, if not his syntax, is his willingness to posit a coherent theory of mind in the traditional vein but in entirely new clothing. It's refreshing to see a modern philosopher actually doing philosophy, not critiquing the philosophy of others. Searle would probably have advanced his cause by having someone else tidy up his presentation, as this drawback reduces the splendor of the overall book.
2 of 3 people found the following review helpful.
THE THIRD PART OF A “TRILOGY” BY THE FAMED ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHER
By Steven H Propp
John Rogers Searle (born 1932) is an American philosopher at UC Berkeley. He has written many other books, such as The Rediscovery of the Mind, The Mystery of Consciousness, Expression and Meaning, Speech Acts, Mind: A Brief Introduction, Mind, Language And Society, The Construction of Social Reality, etc.
He wrote in the Introduction to this 1983 book, “The primary aim of this book is to develop a theory of intentionality. I hesitate to call it a general theory because a large number of topics, e.g., the emotions, are left undiscussed, but I do believe the approach here presented will prove useful for explaining Intentional phenomena generally. This book is the third in a series of related studies of mind and language. One of its objectives is to provide a foundation for my two earlier books, ‘Speech Acts’ … and ‘Expression and Meaning.’”
In the first chapter, he states, “I am really making two claims here, and they need to be distinguished. In am claiming first that Intentional states are in general parts of Networks of Intentional states and only have their conditions of satisfaction relative to their position in the Network. Versions of this view, generally called ‘holism,’ are quite common in contemporary philosophy; indeed a certain effortless holism is something of a current philosophical orthodoxy. But I am also making a second, much more controversial claim: in addition to the Network of representations, there is also a background of nonrepresentational mental capacities; and, in general, representations only function they only have the conditions of satisfaction that they do, against this nonrepresentational Background.” (Pg. 20-21)
He summarizes, “I want to argue that the traditional sense data theorists were correct in recognizing that we have experiences, visual and otherwise, but they mislocated the Intentionality of perception in supposing that experiences were the objects of perception, and the naïve realists were correct in recognizing that material objects and events are characteristically the objects of perception, but many of them failed to realize that the material object can only be the object of visual perception because the perception has an Intentional content, and the vehicle of the Intentional content is a visual experience.” (Pg. 60-61)
He explains in chapter 3, “We are not trying to show that Intentionality is really something else, but rather to explain it in terms of a family of notions each of which is explained independently, usually by way of examples. To repeat: these is no nonintentional standpoint from which we can survey the relations between Intentional states and their conditions of satisfaction. Any analysis must take place from within the circle of Intentional concepts.” (Pg. 79)
He argues, “I am rejecting both accounts of experience. Both accounts fail to describe the Intentionality of our experiences of acting and perceiving. They both fail to account for the fact that the conditions of satisfaction are determined by the experience and that part of the conditions of satisfaction is that the experience is one of making its Intentional object happen or one of its Intentional object making it happen. For this reason we can experience causation, but we don’t have to have an a priori concept of cause to do it, any more than we have to have an a priori concept of red to experience redness.” (Pg. 132)
He notes, “But when it comes to examining the conditions of the possibility of the functioning of the mind, we simply have very little vocabulary to hand except the vocabulary of first-order Intentional states. There simply is no first-order for the Background, because the Background has no Intentionality. As the precondition of Intentionality, the Background is as invisible to Intentionality as the eye which sees is invisible to itself.” (Pg. 157)
He observes in the Epilogue, “My own approach to mental states and events has been totally realistic in the sense that I think there really are such things as intrinsic mental phenomena which cannot be reduced to something else or eliminated by some kind of re-definition. There really are pains, tickles, and itches, beliefs, fears, hopes, desires, perceptual experiences, experiences of acting, thoughts, feelings, and all the rest. Now you might think that such a claim was so obviously true as to be hardly worth making, but the amazing thing is that is it routinely denied, though usually in a disguised form, by many, perhaps most, of the advanced thinkers who write on these topics.” (Pg. 262)
He continues, “no one ever came to these views by a close scrutiny of the phenomena in question. No one ever considered his own terrible pain or his deepest worry and concluded that they were just Turing machine states or that they could be entirely defined in terms of their causes and effects or that attributing such states to themselves was just a matter of taking a certain stance toward themselves. Second, no one would think of treating other biological phenomena in this way.” (Pg. 263)
He concludes, “The picture that I have been suggesting, and the picture that I believe will eventually lead to a resolution of the dilemma, is one according to which mental states are both CAUSED by the operations of the brain and REALIZED IN the structure of the brain… Once the possibility of mental and physical phenomena standing in both these relations is understood we have removed at least one major obstacle to seeing how mental states which are caused by brain states can also cause further brain states and mental states.”
This book will be “must reading” for anyone seriously studying Searle’s thought, or the philosophy of mind in general.
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